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Abstract. 
A growing body of work suggests that in some circumstances humans may be capable of 
ascribing mental states to others in a way that is fast, cognitively efficient, and implicit (implicit 
mentalising hypothesis). However, the interpretation of this work has recently been challenged 
by suggesting that the observed effects may reflect ‘sub-mentalising’ effects of attention and 
memory, with no ascription of mental states (sub-mentalising hypothesis). The present study 
employed a strong test between these hypotheses by examining whether apparently automatic 
processing of another’s visual perspective (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley 
Scott, 2010) is influenced by experience-dependent beliefs about whether that person can see 
(e.g., Heyes 2014). Altercentric interference was observed when participants judged their own 
perspective on stimuli involving an avatar wearing goggles that participants believed to be 
transparent, but not when they believed the goggles to be opaque. These results are consistent 
with participants ascribing mental states to the avatar, and not with the sub-mentalising 
hypothesis that altercentric interference arises merely because avatars cue shifts in spatial 
attention. 
 
Keywords: visual perspective taking; implicit mentalising; sub-mentalising; altercentric 
interferences 
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Introduction 
What do you think I think you think? Explicit judgements about others’ mental states 
develop late in children and remain cognitively demanding for adults, requiring effortful 
deployment of executive resources (e.g., Apperly, 2010; German & Hehman, 2006; Perner & 
Lang, 1999; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005; Wellman, Cross & 
Watson, 2001). At least some aspects of mentalising, however, may be achieved in a way that is 
much more cognitively efficient. In accord with this notion, recent studies have shown that the 
visual point of view of others (Samson et al., 2010), their actions (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 
2003), and even their beliefs (Kòvacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Schneider, Lam, Bayliss & 
Dux, 2012) may be processed implicitly in a relatively automatic, fast, and efficient manner.   
For example, adults may spontaneously process what another person can see (Level-1 
visual perspective taking), even when the processing of other person’s perspective is irrelevant 
to task and results in interference with explicit judgements of one’s own perspective (Samson et 
al., 2010). This altercentric intrusion effect has been reported in both adults and children, 
suggesting that it may reflect the operation of a cognitively efficient process present since 
infantcy (Surtees & Apperly, 2012). This and other lines of evidence (Clements & Perner, 1994; 
Sebanz et al., 2003; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007; Zwickel, 
2009; Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010; Kovacs et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2012; Schneider, 
Nott & Dux, 2014) support the view that humans have two distinct systems for mentalising 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009): one early developing, automatic, fast and efficient, implicit system, 
and a later developing, controlled, slow, and flexible explicit system. Level-1 visual perspective 
taking requires only limited cognitive control and may be part of this low-level and implicit 
system for mind reading. 
 However, recent theoretical and empirical work has questioned the existence of implicit 
mentalising in adults and infants, and suggested that results reported to date could be due to 
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‘sub-mentalising’, whereby domain general cognitive processes for memory and attention 
simulate the effects of mentalising in social contexts (Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban, Catmur, 
Hopkins, Bird & Heyes, 2014). It therefore remains unclear whether the altercentric intrusion 
effect provides evidence of implicit mentalising.  
The current study 
Our experiment used a novel adaptation of Samson et al.’s (2010) avatar paradigm to test 
the alternative predictions arising from the sub-mentalising hypothesis (Heyes, 2014) and the 
implicit mentalising hypothesis for Level 1 visual perspective taking. In the original version of 
the paradigm, participants judged the number of discs that they could see on the walls of a 
cartoon room (self-perspective) or the number of discs that could be seen by an avatar standing 
in the room (other-perspective). On consistent perspective trials, both the participant and the 
avatar could see the same number of discs. On inconsistent perspective trials, the avatar saw 
fewer discs than the participant did (some of the discs were not visible to the avatar). When 
participants made explicit judgements about the avatar’s perspective (other-perspective 
judgements), they were slower and more error prone when the avatar’s perspective differed from 
their own (egocentric intrusion effect). This is consistent with reports of egocentric bias in adults 
(e.g., Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003). Critically, however, participants were also slower and 
more error prone to make explicit judgements of their own perspective (i.e., how many discs 
they saw) when the avatar happened to see a different number. This is clearly compatible with 
implicit mentalising, because it suggests that, even when the avatar’s perspective was irrelevant 
to the task, participants could not prevent themselves from computing what they saw 
(altercentric intrusion effect).  
In the avatar paradigm, however, the avatar is not only an agent with a distinct 
perspective on the scene; s/he is also a directional cue, oriented towards one side of the scene or 
the other. It has been known for some time that such directional cues can lead to automatic 
reorientation of a viewer’s attention from the centrally presented stimulus to the side to which 
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the cue is oriented, and that similar effects (albeit with some distinctive characteristics) may be 
obtained from social stimuli such as faces and non-social spatial cues such as arrows (e.g., 
Tipples, 2002). It is of course highly likely that such spatial cueing is an important component of 
the processes leading to the altercentric effects observed by Samson et al. (2010). However, the 
sub-mentalising hypothesis holds that spatial cueing might be wholly sufficient to account for 
the altercentric effects. Consistent with this view, Santiesteban et al. (2014) recently reported 
altercentric interference for arrow stimuli. Participants were slower to verify the number of discs 
that they could see, when this number was inconsistent (rather than consistent) with the number 
to which an arrow was pointing.  Because arrows have directional, but not agentive features, this 
has been interpreted as evidence for sub-mentalising (in this case, a generic attentional process), 
rather than implicit mentalising.  
One problem with the Santiesteban et al.’s manipulation, however, is that it does not 
successfully control for attribution of mental states. Previous studies  have shown that simple 
geometric shapes can activate theory of mind processes (Klein, Zwickel, Prinz & Frith, 2009; 
Castelli, Happé, Frith & Frith, 2000). Arrows, in particular, are used to indicate direction and 
there is evidence that even young children attach not only attentional, but also intentional 
meanings to arrow cues. For example, Pellicano and Rhodes (2003) pitted arrow and gaze cues 
against one another in a task where 3- to 4-year-olds were asked to judge which of a set of 
chocolates was desired and would be acted upon by a cartoon character. Children were more 
likely to rely on the arrow cue than the gaze cue, suggesting that the intentional aspect of 
overlearned symbols such as arrow cues may not only guide mental state ascriptions but may be 
selected in preference to gaze cues in some circumstances. As Santiesteban et al. acknowledge, it 
is thus possible that “generalizing from the avatar to the arrow stimulus, participants represented 
the number of dots in front of the arrow as the number of dots that the arrow could ‘see’, 
engaging in implicit mentalising in both the avatar and the arrow condition” (Santiesteban et al., 
2014).  
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To examine the implicit mentalising hypothesis against sub-mentalising hypothesis in the 
absence of such confounds, here we adopted an approach in which mental state attribution was 
manipulated directly while holding the stimuli constant. Following Teufel, Alexis, Todd, 
Lawrance-Owen, Klayton, & Davis (2009), the avatar wore one of two pairs of coloured 
goggles, both with highly mirrored lenses such that it was impossible to see the eyes of the 
wearer. Using a belief induction procedure, participants were led to believe that, from the 
perspective of the avatar, one pair was transparent and the other pair was completely opaque. 
While watching the stimuli, they therefore believed that, when wearing one pair of googles, the 
avatar could see the discs on the wall (seeing condition), whereas when wearing the other pair, 
the avatar could not see the discs of the wall (non-seeing condition).  
The sub-mentalising hypothesis predicts that the spatial information from the avatar’s 
body orientation is a sufficient condition for observation of the altercentric effect. If this is 
correct, then we would expect the altercentric intrusion in both the seeing condition and the non-
seeing condition, i.e., irrespective of the participant’s attribution of a ‘seeing’ mental state to the 
avatar. Alternatively, if the altercentric intrusion effect depends on calculation of what the avatar 
can see (consistent with the implicit mentalising hypothesis), then the effect should only occur 
when participants believe that the avatar can see. We would thus predict that the effect would 
occur in the seeing condition, but not in the non-seeing condition. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Eighteen undergraduates postgraduate students from the University of Birmingham took 
part in this experiment (11 females; mean age: 23.80 ± 3.54, range 20-38 years) for credits or for 
a small honorarium (£4). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naïve to the 
purpose of the study. The study was performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid 
down in the revised Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association General Assembly, 2008).  
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Stimuli and procedures 
The stimuli and procedures were similar to those of Samson et al. (2010). Participants 
were presented with a picture showing a lateral view of a room with the left, back, and right 
walls visible, and with discs displayed on one or two walls (the left and the right ones). A human 
avatar was positioned in the centre of the room, facing either the left or the right wall. Female 
participants were presented with a female avatar and male participants were presented with a 
male avatar. 
On half of the trials, both participants and the avatar could see the same amount of dots 
(consistent perspective trials), whereas on the other half of trials, the avatar could see fewer dots 
than the participant (inconsistent perspective trials; see Supplemental Material) 
On the 33% of trials, the avatar did not wear goggles (eyes condition, neutral stimuli). On 
the remaining 66% of trials, the avatar wore a coloured pair of goggles (red or orange), both with 
highly mirrored lenses such that it was impossible to see the eyes of the avatar (Figure 1). Prior 
to the experiment (see the belief induction procedure described below), participants were 
informed that the orange (or red) pair of goggles was transparent, while the red (or orange) pair 
of goggles was opaque. While watching the stimuli, they therefore believed that avatar could see 
through the orange pair of goggles (seeing condition, 33% of trials), but not through the red pair 
(non-seeing condition, 33% of trials), or vice versa. In order to avoid confusion about the 
goggles colour associated with the seeing and the non-seeing conditions, transparent goggles 
trials and opaque goggles trials were not mixed together in the same block: participants 
completed three blocks where the seeing and eyes trials were mixed together and three blocks 
where the non-seeing and eyes trials were mixed together. To have the same total number of 
trials for each condition, each block included 66% of goggles stimuli and 33% of neutral stimuli. 
Block order and goggles colour (red_seeing and orange_non-seeing; orange_seeing and 
red_non-seeing) were counterbalanced between participants. 
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E-prime software was used to control the stimulus presentation and data collection. Each 
trial began with a fixation cross presented for 750 ms. 500 ms later, the word “YOU” or 
“HE”/“SHE” appeared for 750 ms, telling participants whether they had to judge the scene using 
their own perspective (self perspective) or that of the avatar (other perspective). 500 ms later, a 
digit (0-3) appeared for 750 ms and specified the perspective content for the participant to verify. 
Finally, the picture of the room (640 x 480 pixel) appeared in the centre of the screen for a 
maximum of 2000 ms or until participants completed the trial by pressing one of two keys to 
indicate whether or not the digit correctly specified the number of discs seen from the relevant 
perspective. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible when 
the picture of the room appeared. 
Three hundred trials were divided in 6 blocks of 50 test trials (48 test trials and 2 filler 
trials) and were preceded by a block of 26 practice trials. For each condition, there were 24 
consistent trials and 24 inconsistent trials. The number of YES and NO responses trials was the 
same for each condition (24 YES responses and 24 NO responses). The order of blocks was 
counterbalanced between subjects and the order of trials within a block was randomized. Filler 
trials (no dots present in the image of the room) allowed the cued number “0” to also match self-
perspective judgments.  
Belief induction  
Before the first block associated with the seeing or the non-seeing condition started, participants 
tried on a red and an orange pair of goggles in order to gain first person experience of the visual 
properties of the goggles and the visual experience of the avatar. They were asked to watch in 
the direction of the monitor for one minute. Two pairs of googles were used. Depending on the 
condition, the insides of the lenses of the orange and the red pair of goggles were made 
completely opaque using a black cardboard. The other pair was untreated and thus transparent to 
the wearer. Half of the participants, chosen at random, wore red goggles that were transparent 
from their perspective and an orange pair that was opaque; this pattern was reversed for the 
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remaining half of the participants. Hence, to all participants, one pair of goggles (associated with 
the seeing condition) signalled that the avatar could see, and the other pair (associated with the 
non-seeing condition) signalled that the avatar could not see. The lenses of all goggles had 
identical external appearances.   
Manipulation check  
In order to assess the efficacy of the deception procedure, after the experiment, 
participants were asked to perform a visual search task wearing one pair of goggles at their own 
choice. All participants chose the pair of goggles associated with the seeing condition. 
 
Results 
Trials in which participants made an error were discarded from the RT analysis (4.54%). 
In addition, individual trials were removed if responses were made in excess of 2.5 standard 
deviations of the participant’s mean reaction time (1.63%). One participant had to be excluded 
from the analysis due to excessively slow response times (2.5 SD over the overall conditional 
means in 8 out of 12 experimental conditions). As for Samson et al. (2010), because of the 
unbalanced way in which mismatching trials had to be constructed, we considered the 
mismatching (“no” response) trials as fillers (as they would artificially inflate the consistency 
effect) and only analysed the data of the matching (“yes” response) trials. RTs and errors were 
submitted to a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (eyes, seeing, and non-
seeing), Perspective (self, other) and Consistency (consistent, inconsistent) as within-subject 
factors. Sphericity of the data was verified prior to performing statistical analyses (Mauchly’s 
test, p>0.05). For significant two-way interactions, t-tests were performed between the 
appropriate levels of the factors involved, using a Bonferroni correction (α level < 0.05) for 
multiple tests.   
RT analysis. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Perspective (F(1,16)=5.85, 
p=0.027, pη2=0.269), and a significant main effect of Consistency (F(1,16)=49.90, p<0.001, 
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pη2=0.757).  The main effect of Condition did not approach significance (F(1,16)=0.576, 
p=0.568, pη2=0.035). There was also a significant Condition x Consistency interaction 
(F(1,16)=11.87, p<0.001, pη2=0.426), a significant Perspective x Consistency interaction 
(F(1,16)=8.44, p=0.010, pη2=0.345), and a significant Perspective x Condition (F(1,16)=5.01, 
p=0.013, pη2=0.239) interaction. These two-way interactions were qualified by a significant 
three-way Condition x Perspective x Consistency interaction (F(1,16)=3.71, p=0.035, 
pη2=0.188).  
The three-way interaction was tested by running separate ANOVAs in each condition 
(see Figure 2). For the eyes condition, there was a reliable effect of Perspective (F(1,16)=50.89, 
p<0.001, pη2=0.761) and a reliable effect of Consistency (F(1,16)=36.87, p<0.001, pη2=0.697), 
which were further qualified by a significant interaction between Perspective and Consistency 
(F(1,16)=21.73, p<0.001, pη2=0.576). Paired-sample t-tests confirmed a significant egocentric 
intrusion effect when participants judged the avatar’s perspective, with RTs being faster for 
consistent (614 ms) than for inconsistent trials (748 ms) (t(16)=7.88, p<0.001). Further, there 
was a significant altercentric intrusion effect when participants judged their own perspective, 
with faster RTs for consistent (579 ms) than for inconsistent trials (621 ms) (t(16)=2.32, 
p=0.034). 
For the seeing condition, there was no main effect of Perspective (F(1,16)=0.678, 
p=0.422, pη2=0.041), but a significant main effect of Consistency (F(1,16)=27.45, p<0.001, 
pη2=0.632), further qualified by a significant Perspective x Consistency interaction 
(F(1,16)=9.81, p=0.006, pη2=0.380). Paired-sample t-tests revealed a significant egocentric 
intrusion effect when participants judged the avatar’s perspective, with quicker responses for 
consistent (610 ms) than for inconsistent trials (719 ms) (t(16)=5.16, p<0.001). There was also 
evidence for a significant altercentric intrusion effect, with faster RTs for consistent (625 ms) 
than for inconsistent trials (671 ms) when participants judged their own perspective (t(16)=3.28, 
p=0.005). 
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For the non-seeing condition, no effect approached significance (Perspective: 
F(1,16)=0.761, p=0.396, pη2=0.045; Consistency: F(1,16)=0.738, p=0.403, pη2=0.044; 
Perspective x Consistency: F(1,16)=0.065, p=0.801, pη2=0.004). 
Accuracy analysis. The 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Consistency (F(1,16)=9.18, p=0.008, pη2=0.365) and a significant main effect of Perspective 
(F(1,16)=5.06, p=0.039, pη2=0.240). The effect of Condition was non-significant (F(1,16)=1.82, 
p=0.178, pη2=0.102). These effects were qualified by a significant Condition x Consistency 
interaction (F(1,16)=3.59, p=0.039, pη2=0.183), whereby participants were more accurate in 
consistent than in inconsistent trials for the eyes (p=0.014; 99.26% vs 93.87% of accuracy) and 
the seeing conditions (p=0.015; 97.79% vs 90.68%), with no difference between consistent and 
inconsistent trials for the non-seeing condition (p=0.743; 95.83% vs 95.34%; see Figure 3). No 
other interaction was found to be significant.  
 
Discussion 
Previous studies sought to manipulate mental state attribution by manipulating the 
stimulus properties (Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2014). For example, Santiesteban 
and colleagues (2014) replaced the avatar with an arrow to manipulate the attribution of a 
‘seeing’ mental state. A problem with this strategy is that the complex dependencies between the 
stimulus properties and mental state attribution make it impossible to determine which of these 
two factors is responsible for differential findings.  
The belief induction procedure provides a valuable strategy to overcome this limitation, 
ensuring full control over stimulus properties (see also Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis 2010; Heyes, 
2014). In the present study, we adopted this strategy to directly test the implicit mentalising 
hypothesis against the sub-mentalising hypothesis. Participants were asked to judge either their 
own visual perspective or the perspective of a human avatar wearing red or orange googles, 
which participants believed to be either transparent or opaque. When participants believed that 
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the avatar was wearing transparent goggles and could therefore see the discs on the wall, they 
were slower to judge their own perspective on inconsistent trials compared to inconsistent trials 
(altercentric intrusion effect). However, when they believed that that the goggles were opaque 
and the avatar could not see, there was no altercentric intrusion effect. The sub-mentalising 
hypothesis that altercentric interference is the sole consequence of the directional features of the 
stimuli has no resources to explain our observation of an altercentric intrusion effect in the 
seeing condition, but not in the non-seeing condition, because the directional features of the 
stimuli were identical in the two cases (Heyes, 2014). The only difference between these 
conditions was participants’ belief about whether or not the avatar was able to see the discs on 
the wall.  
Importantly, however, we find common ground with the sub-mentalising account insofar 
as it seems entirely plausible that shifts in attention due to exogenous spatial cues may be 
necessary for observing altercentric interference, even though the mere presence of such cues is 
not sufficient. This is important because it helps expose theoretically distinct interpretations of 
implicit mentalising. One interpretation is that implicit mentalising arises through a cognitive 
mechanism that is entirely distinct from other cognitive processes. On this account, shifts in 
attention due to exogenous spatial cues are not part of the information processing pathway that 
leads to altercentric interference. An alternative interpretation is that implicit mentalising is 
closely integrated with attentional processes, and that cue-driven shifts in attention are integral to 
the fast and efficient calculation of what the avatar sees. This interpretation derives support from 
studies showing that the automatic tendency to shift one’s attentions towards locations looked at 
by others is top-down influenced by mental state attribution (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 
2010; see also Teufel et al., 2009). When observers believed that the other person could see, the 
tendency to follow another’s gaze was automatic (in the sense that it could not be entirely 
suppressed). However, when they believed that the other person could not see, gaze following 
could be overridden voluntarily. These findings suggest an interactive relationship between the 
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mechanisms supporting basic sensory processing of social information and mentalising 
processes (Teufel et al., 2009).   
These interpretations of implicit mentalising clearly differ in their processing 
architectures and would give rise to distinct experimental predictions. What they have in 
common is that altercentric interference arises from ascription to the avatar of a mental state of 
‘seeing’ that differs from what participants see themselves. That is to say, altercentric 
interference results from mentalising, not sub-mentalising. 
In the non-seeing condition, we found no effect of Consistency on other-perspective 
trials, suggesting participants were not influenced by their own visual perspective when judging 
the avatar’s perspective. This lack of egocentric intrusion may appear surprising given the 
robustness and generality of egocentric biases (e.g., Royzman et al., 2003). However, we believe 
that the most likely explanation for this effect is a theoretically uninteresting consequence of our 
design, which necessarily led to the avatar in the non-seeing condition having an entirely 
predictable perspective of “zero” on every trial. Since participants believed that the avatar could 
not see, other-perspective judgements could be made on the basis of this stored knowledge 
without ad hoc computation of how many discs could be seen, either from the avatar’s 
perspective or from their own perspective. As a result, their response did not suffer from 
egocentric biases. 
Conclusions and future directions 
Results reported to date on implicit mentalising have been criticized on the ground that 
they could be due to sub-mentalising, i.e., to domain-general cognitive processes sensitive to 
low-level stimulus features. A strategy to disentangle these two levels of explanation involves 
using ‘self-informed’ belief induction variables – variables that people know to be indicative of 
what an agent can or cannot see and, therefore, does or does not believe, only through 
extrapolation from their own experience (Heyes, 2014). This strategy has been pursued in 
research involving chimpanzees (e.g., Penn & Povinelli, 2007), human adults (e.g., Langton, 
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2009; Teufel et al., 2009) and infants (e.g., Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011). 
Here, we combined the logic of self-informed belief induction with the avatar task to test for the 
implicit attribution of seeing to the avatar. We found that altercentric intrusions depended on the 
attribution of a seeing mental state to the avatar. Indeed, an altercentric interference effect was 
only observed when participants believed that the avatar could see the discs on the opposing 
wall. These findings speak against a reductive sub-mentalising account and suggest that the 
altercentric intrusion effect is instead due to the implicit mentalising of another person’s visual 
perspective. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli used for the goggles conditions. A) Avatar wearing orange 
goggles (consistent condition). B) Avatar wearing orange goggles (inconsistent condition). C) 
Avatar wearing red goggles (consistent condition). D) Avatar wearing red goggles (inconsistent 
condition). 
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the three way interaction Condition (eyes, seeing, and non-
seeing) by Perspective (self vs. other) by Consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) on RTs. Bars 
represent standard errors of the means. Asterisks indicate significance for the main contrasts of 
interest. 
 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the interaction Condition (eyes, seeing, and non-seeing) by 
Consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) on accuracy. Participants were more accurate in 
consistent than in inconsistent trials for the eyes and the seeing conditions. Bars represent 
standard errors of the means.  
 
 
 
 
